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"Copyright in a work protected under this title [Title 17 of U.S.C.]
vests initially in the author or authors of the work."'
"The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law .... Any
of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright

.,.

transferred... and owned separately."'

may be

Introduction
The ability of an author to transfer ownership of a copyright was
intended as an incentive for authors to create works, by enabling
them to retain some rights over their creations while gaining
economic benefits from selling other rights.3 Publishers have
corrupted this statutory right of authors, however, through the use of
contract law. This is an especially poignant problem in the print
industry. Each time a court determines that a right is initially vested
in an author, print publishers, by virtue of their superior bargaining
power over authors, include the assignment of that right in all future
contracts with authors. Therefore, all allocations of rights to authors
are nullities, as the right will be transferred, by contract, to the print
publisher without any additional compensation to the author. This
problem is exacerbated by the allocation of the burden of proof in
determining whether the additional compensation was voluntarily
provided. In order to be able to publish his work and still retain even
one right out of the bundle of copy-rights, an author must sell the
rights to the publisher, violate the contract, wait to be sued for breach
of contract, and then assert the affirmative defense of coercion. In the
affirmative defense, the author can argue that he did not voluntarily
relinquish any additional rights, but his only proof is the lack of
additional consideration for the additionally transferred rights,
assuming the author has previously sold to this publisher. The
probability of the author being able to meet this burden is slim, if not
nonexistent. Thus, a publisher can require any author who desires to
publish his work to transfer virtually all of his rights to the publisher,
without providing any compensation for rights beyond the right to
reproduce the work.
In this Note, I present a method of solving this problem: shift the
burden of proving whether the contract was entered into
involuntarily, in intellectual property cases, from the seller (who is the
1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
3. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,495-96,495 n.3 (2001).
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breaching party) to the buyer (the non-breaching party). Although
showing that the contract was not voluntarily entered into is an
affirmative defense, and the burden of proof for an affirmative
4
defense is normally on the party claiming the defense, this allocation
of the burden does not make sense in intellectual property cases. The
difference between "normal" property and intellectual property
derives from the initial allocation of rights. With "normal" property,
the rights initially lie in the seller of the property, the non-breaching
party. In intellectual property, the rights also initially lie in the seller
of the property, but in this situation the seller is the breaching party.
The crucial difference lies in the convergence or divergence of the
initial rights owner and the breaching party. When the seller of the
property claims the contract was not voluntarily made, as is the case
in intellectual property disputes, the importance of this difference can
be seen. In this situation, placing the burden on the author-seller
deprives him of the fact that the rights were initially allocated to him.
The initial allocation is then meaningless, because the publisherbuyer bears no burden of showing that the author voluntarily
surrendered all of his rights. To solve this problem, Congress should
shift the burden of proof from the author-seller to the publisherbuyer, thereby forcing the publisher to show that the rights were
voluntarily transferred, and thus overcome the presumption
engendered by the initial allocation.5
This Note will provide the underlying rationales behind this
proposal. In Part I, the initial allocation of rights, and the importance
of this initial allocation, will be addressed. The rejection of the
concept that the freedom to contract is constitutionally mandated will
be explored in Part II. This rejection shows that Congress has the
ability to effectively constrict the rights of contracting parties and that
the freedom to contract is not of the same constitutional significance
as the allocation of copy-rights. Part III will describe the initial
allocation of the burden of proof under contracts and copyrights and
4. See JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 346(1) (5th ed. 1999) ("The
term affirmative defense is traditionally used to describe the allocation of a burden, either
of production or of persuasion, or both, to the defendant in a criminal case.").
5. To put this a different way, Congress should create a presumption in favor of
authors that they do not voluntarily give away more rights than necessary. The burden of
proof would then lie on the publisher to rebut this presumption by proving the rights were
voluntarily transferred. Either way, the result is the same-the burden lies with the
publisher. See id. § 342 ("Certainly the description of a presumption as a rule that, at a
minimum, shifts the burden of producing evidence is to be preferred, at least in civil
cases."); see also id. § 343 ("[Slome presumptions are created to correct an imbalance
resulting from one party's superior access to the proof.").
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will show how intellectual property is different from other contractual
transfers of rights. Finally, in Part IV, the need for, and effects of,
shifting the burden from authors to publishers will be presented.

I.

Initial Allocation of Rights Under Copyright

In any effort to determine who has a right and what rights have
been transferred to whom, it is appropriate to begin the inquiry by
determining where the right was initially vested. For copy-rights, as
seen above, each right conferred by a copyright is originally conferred
upon the author.6 This initial allocation is constitutionally mandated,

as congressional authority to grant copyrights is limited to granting
the exclusive rights to works "to Authors and Inventors."7 This

determination, however, elicits two additional questions: (1) what
rights are included in the grant of a copyright; and (2) does it matter

where the rights are initially vested?
The answer to the first question can be found in the U.S. Code.

Section 106 of Title 17 enumerates the rights granted to authors,
subject to the fair use restrictions of sections 107 through 122.8 This
question is also the foundation of the problem at issue in this Note:
each time a court determines that a use of a work is a derivative work,
the right to that use is a part of the copyright.9 Thus, in contractual
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have the Power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.") (emphasis
added).
8. This section states:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
9. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499 (2001) ("The Publishers'
encompassing construction of the § 201(c) privilege is unacceptable, we conclude, for it
would diminish the Authors' exclusive rights in the Articles."); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
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transferals of rights, it must be determined which rights have been
conveyed to the publisher and whether all of these rights were

voluntarily given.
According to law and economics, the answer to the second

question depends on the market. In a perfect market, the initial
allocation of a right does not effect who will end up with the right.' °
This is because there are no transaction costs. In this situation, the
party that places the highest value on the right will end up with the
right, because he will pay an amount equal to or greater than the
value that the copyright holder deems the right to be worth, 1 and find
this to be a bargain (remember, he values the right higher than the

copyright holder). Because there is no cost in the exchange, this result
will always obtain in a transaction-free market. Even in this situation,
however, the initial allocation of rights retains some importance. The
initial allocation will still, even in a transaction-cost-free environment,
impact the distribution of wealth.12 If the right is initially allocated to

the party who puts the highest value on it, then it will not cost him
anything to purchase the right; however, if the right is given to
another party, then the first party must buy the right, and therefore
he must transfer some of his wealth to the right-holding party. Thus,
the initial allocation alters the distribution of wealth, even in a market

without transaction costs.
The impact of the initial allocation of rights is more pronounced
in the real-world market, because the market is not perfect. 3 In the

real world, there are transaction costs. "These costs include search
costs, information costs, the costs of meetings, negotiation and any
other costs incurred to make the primary exchange occur.' ' 14 In this
situation, the party who places the greatest value on the right may not
Music, 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994) ("Evidence of substantial harm to it would weigh against a
finding of fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive
to the creation of originals.").
10. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(establishing the "Coase Theorem," which states that the assignment of rights by courts or
the legislature may have little bearing on who ultimately possesses those rights).
11. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 56-60 (1995)
(discussing the allocative implications of the Coase Theorem and providing examples of
how the party who places the highest value on a resource will purchase that resource).
12 See id. at 60 ("This hardly means the assignment by the court, legislature or
administrative body is irrelevant. That assignment can have huge distributive effects.").
13. See id. at 62 ("[V]irtually all exchanges have a cost. These costs are called
transaction costs."); RICHARD WATr, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS
OR FOES? 17 (2000) ("[T]he absence of transaction costs ... is certainly not present when
copyright is transferred.").
14. HARRISON, supra note 11, at 62.
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end up with that right. This will happen if the transaction costs are
greater than the difference between the value he places on the right
and the value placed on it by the copyright holder. 5 Thus, because the
purchaser must pay the sum of the value given to the right by the
copyright holder plus the transaction costs, the total price exceeds the
value he places on the right, and he will not purchase the right.
Therefore, the initial allocation of rights impacts who eventually will
possess the right. Furthermore, the impact on the distribution of
rights seen in the perfect market scenario is also present in this
situation. In an economic sense, then, the initial allocation of copyrights does actually matter.
II. Contract as a Constitutional Mandate
Once a copyright has been granted, the market forces described
in Part I begin to operate. For copyrights, the transferal of rights,
from author to publisher, is accomplished by contract. Enter the
problem described in the introduction. Because of unequal bargaining
power, authors are forced to assign all of their rights to publishers,
instead of merely some rights, and usually do not even receive
compensation for any right conveyed beyond the right of publication.
And with the burden of proof resting on the author to show that the
contract was unfair, he has no viable method of keeping any rights,
assuming that he wants to publish his work. For my proposed solution
to this problem to succeed, however, Congress must have the
authority to regulate both contractual provisions and the burden of
proof for those provisions. This section considers Congress's ability to
legislate regarding the freedom to contract.
A. Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the Freedom to Contract

Approximately one hundred years ago, Congress would not have
had the authority to modify contractual rights to solve this dilemma.
At that time, the freedom to contract was considered a constitutional
right that could not be taken from an individual or an organization.
This limitation on Congressional authority resulted from a series of
cases, the most famous of which is Lochner v. New York. 6
Lochner, however, was actually the second in a series of cases in
which the Supreme Court addressed the freedom to contract. The
15. See id. ("If these costs exceed the gain from the exchange itself, the exchange will
not take place.").
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952).
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first case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana," involved the constitutionality of a
Louisiana statute which imposed a fine on any party who contracted
with a marine insurance company that did not comply with the state's
laws. 8 Upon consideration by the Supreme Court, it held that "the
statute [was] a violation of the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution, in that it deprive[d] the defendants of their liberty
without due process of law."1 9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
interpreted the term "liberty" to include "the right of the citizen...
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
[enumerated by the Court]. ' '2° Thus, after this interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the freedom to contract was a right
guaranteed, against the states, by the Due Process Clause.
Eight years later, the Court relied on this decision in Lochner.
The Lochner Court read the challenged New York labor statute as
not allowing any employee of a bakery to contract or agree to work
more than ten hours per day. 2' The court held that "[t]he statute
necessarily interfere[d] with the right of contract between the
employer and employes [sic] .... "2 The court then stated that the
right to contract for business purposes is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, citing Allgeyer. 3 Finally, because the statute "[ran]
counter to that liberty of person and of free contract provided for in
the Federal Constitution,"' 4 the Court held the statute to be
unconstitutional.25
In the third case in this series, Adair v. United States,26 the
Supreme Court extended the reasoning from Lochner to invalidate
Congressional legislation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. The
challenged statute in Adair was a federal statute which made it a
misdemeanor for an employer to fire an employee due to the
employee's membership in a labor organization. 2 The Court first
17. 165 U.S. 578 (1897), overruled by Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron
& Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
18. Id. at 579.
19. Id. at 589.
20. Id.
21. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52.
22 Id. at 53.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 62.
25. Id. at 64.
26. 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
27. Id. at 168-69.
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determined that the "liberty and right [guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment] embrace the right to make contracts for the purchase of
the labor of others, and equally the right to make contracts for the
sale of one's own labor. ... " The Court held that the statute was
"repugnant to the 5th Amendment," and therefore unconstitutional. 29
The Court provided its most definitive pronouncement of the
constitutional right of freedom to contract in the final case, Coppage
v. Kansas.1 In the case, the Court struck down a Kansas statute that
prohibited employers from conditioning employment on the

employee's agreement to refrain from joining a labor organization."3
The most important part of the case came earlier in the decision
however, when the Court stated: "for if Congress is prevented from
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract because of the 'due
process' provision of the 5th Amendment, it is too clear for argument
that the states are prevented from the like interference by virtue of
32 The Court
the corresponding clause of the 14th Amendment ....
also referred to it as the "constitutional freedom to contract."33

Therefore, at this point in time, Congressional ability to regulate
contractual provisions by means of legislation was severely limited.

Congress could not interfere with an individual's or an organization's
constitutional right of freedom to contract. Thus, Congress would not
have had the necessary authority to shift the burden of proof
proposed by this Note.
B.

Rejection of Lochner.No Due Process Right to Contract

Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the freedom to contract
has experienced a massive shift in the last century, however. The
freedom to contract is no longer considered a constitutional right.
Each of the cases discussed above has been overruled, and the theory
propounded in them has been discarded. 4 This rejection of a

2& Id. at 172.
29. Id. at 180.
30. 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.,
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
31. Id. at 26.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 21.
34. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("The doctrine that
prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Bums, and like cases... has long since been
discarded."); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536 (1949) ("This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was
decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the AdairCoppage line of cases."); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 313 U.S. 177,
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constitutional right to the freedom to contract began slowly, with the
recognition that the government possessed the authority to supervise
contractual activity, and gradually expanded to provide that
legislation mandating terms of contracts would ordinarily be upheld.
This trend started in 1934, in Nebbia v. New York." In that case,
the Court upheld a New York statute fixing the price of milk against a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge.6 The Court stated that the
"government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to
the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to
work them harm." 37 Thus, the Court was limiting the freedom of
contract when public interests were involved. The Court also noted
that the due process clause does not mention contracts. 8 Therefore,
this holding demonstrates a jurisprudential shift away from the
freedom to contract as a constitutional right.
The Court specifically rejected the concept of the freedom to
contract as a constitutional right in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.'9
In upholding the State of Washington's minimum wage law, the Court
discussed the freedom of contract, stating: "What is this freedom?
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of
liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of
law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not
recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.'' Without any
mention of the freedom of contract in the Constitution or an absolute
liberty right, the government has at least some authority to restrict
the ability of parties to contract.
Finally, the Court provided some boundaries for the
government's ability to regulate private contracts in Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri.4 ' The Court first stated that it "do[es] not
sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to
decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public
welfare." 42 The state legislatures, therefore, were able to "within
extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so
187 (1941) ("The course of decisions in this Court since Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, have completely sapped those cases of their
authority.").
35. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
36. Id. at 539.
37. Id. at 523.
3& Id. at 532.

39. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
40. Id. at 391.

41. 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
42.

Id. at 423.
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long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so
long as conflicts with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided."43
The Court therefore refused to return to the philosophy of the
Lochner era cases, and it upheld Missouri's voting law. After this
case then, even the state legislatures possess the ability to regulate
contractual provisions, so long as the law is not preempted and they
do not violate specific constitutional prohibitions. By analogy, the
federal legislature should possess the authority to regulate contractual
provisions so long as its statutes do not violate specific constitutional
prohibitions.
These cases illustrate the current understanding of Congressional
ability to regulate contractual provisions: Congress has the authority
to basically impose any restriction on contractual terms that it desires,
if it believes the restriction is necessary for the public welfare.
Therefore, if Congress believes that shifting the burden of proving
that the author voluntarily transferred his entire bundle of copy-rights
would benefit the public welfare, then it has the authority to
effectuate this shift.
III. Allocation of Burden of Proof Under Contracts
and the Effect on Copyrights
A. The Plaintiff's Initial Burden and the Defendant's Response
Before it can be seen why the burden of proof in contracts for
copy-rights needs to be shifted, the current allocations of burdens in
contracts must be determined, along with how these allocations
impact copyrights. In an effort to provide this background, this
section provides a brief overview of contract law before applying
those principles to the specific contract to transfer copy-rights.
To create a valid contract, certain prerequisites must be met. A
valid contract requires an offer, acceptance, and mutual
consideration. 45 The most important of these for present purposes is
the consideration requirement. To be sufficient, the consideration
must be bargained for. 6 Gratuitous promises are not enforceable
43. Id.
44. Id. at 425.
45. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 50, 71 (1981) (defining
offer, acceptance, and consideration); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial
Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REv. 375, 376 n.6 (1990) (listing offer, acceptance, and
consideration as the "formal requirements of contract").
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1981) ("To constitute
consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for.").
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against the promisor.47 In addition, contract modifications also require

consideration. 4 This consideration must be different from the original
consideration for the contract. 49 The purpose of these requirements is
°
to show that both parties assented to the contract. This leads to the

further requirement that the creation of the contract did not involve
any unfair practices, such as duress, unconscionability, or coercion."
In copyright law, there is an initial allocation of rights, but this
allocation can be contracted around. This creates the importance of

contractual requirements in the copyright context. In contracts for
copy-rights, there must be assent and consideration for all of the
rights transferred. In the typical litigation involving these contracts
however, the author has breached the contract.52 This occurs because
the author does not believe he or she has transferred some right,

which the author then exercises, and the publisher alleges this is in
violation of the contract. Thus, the burden of proof on the plaintiff

publisher is to show merely that there is a contract, and it gave
consideration for the copyright. The author must then assert the
affirmative defense of unfair practices, claiming that he or she did not

assent to the transfer of the entire bundle of rights, but merely certain
rights (i.e., publication). The burden of proof for an affirmative
defense, however, is typically allocated to the party making the
47. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 851 (2003) (discussing promissory estoppel-the
one exception to the rule that gratuitous promises are not enforceable).
48. See Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Community Servs., 19 F.3d 359, 364 (7th Cir.
1994) ("A valid modification requires an offer, acceptance, and consideration.") (citations
omitted); 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 7.21 (rev. ed. 1995) (discussing contract modifications); Feng Chen, The
New Era of Chinese ContractLaw: History, Development and a ComparativeAnalysis, 27
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 153, 184-85 (2001) (stating that, at common law, contract modifications
were unenforceable without consideration).
49. See Chicago Coll. of Osteopathic Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 776 F.2d 198, 208
(7th Cir. 1985) ("A modification of a contract is a change in one or more respects which
introduces new elements into the details of the contract, cancels some of them, but leaves
the general purpose and effect undisturbed.") (citation omitted).
App.
50. See MAJS Inv., Inc. v. Albany Bank & Trust Co., 529 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (I11.
1988) ("In order that a modification of a contract may be established, it must be shown
that the parties assented to the same terms.").
51. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998) (unconscionability in commercial contracts); 7 JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 28.2, 28.6, 29.1, 29.4 (rev. ed. 2002) (discussing
duress, coercion, and unconscionability).
52. See, e.g., Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989)
(involving breach of contract claim by video programming producer against book author);
Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Vroom, No. N-89-459, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22979 (D. Conn.
Feb. 3, 1998) (enjoining an author from infringing a consulting firm's copyright on the
author's work, as he had contractually transferred these rights to the firm).
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to the
unfair
major
unfair

practice is difficult to do."4
B.

Copyright is Different

The fact that an author is at a disadvantage does not necessarily
imply that the burden of proof should be shifted to the publisher,
however. It is typical in litigation involving property rights contracts
to place this burden on the party asserting the claim of unfair
practices.55 Copyright, however, is substantially different from other
forms of property, and these differences require a unique analysis for
copyright contracts if fairness and justice are to be maintained.
The main differences between copyright contracts and contracts
involving other forms of property are where the rights are initially
vested and which party (buyer or seller) is in breach. In the typical
contract involving a transfer of property, the party who breaches the
contract is the rights-purchasing party, not the party who was selling
the property. 6 For example, in the rent-to-own industry, the buyer
contracts for the property, fails to make a payment, and claims that
the seller charged too much for the property.57 In this situation, the
buyer did not initially have the rights and is the party in breach,
claiming unfair practices. The same result plays out when the contract
is for labor.58 When the circumstances prevent the hiring party from
53. See STRONG, supra note 4, at § 346(1) ("The term affirmative defense is
traditionally used to describe the allocation of a burden, either of production or of
persuasion, or both, to the defendant in a criminal case.").
54. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976) ("It may sometimes be difficult to
ascertain whether a transfer of copyright is voluntary or is coerced by covert pressure.").
55. See STRONG, supra note 4, at § 346(1).
56. See, e.g., Chateaugay Ore & Iron Co. v. Blake 144 U.S. 476 (1892) (affirming
judgment in favor of seller in breach of contract case for failure to pay the entire contract
price); CT Chems. Inc. v. Vinmar Impex, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 159 (N.Y. 1993) (affirming
summary judgment for plaintiff seller for breach of contract when defendant refused to
make payment); Hansen v. Fresno Jersey Farm Dairy Co., 31 P.2d 359 (Cal. 1934)
(affirming judgment for plaintiff seller for breach of contract due to defendant's failure to
pay the full contract price); Jackson v. Barrera, 740 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App. 1987) (affirming
award of attorney's fees to plaintiff seller who had prevailed in breach of contract for real
estate claim).
57. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(remanding a case involving the purchase of furniture by installments).
58. See, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902) (finding a
contract between fishermen and corporation did not have adequate consideration because
fishermen merely agreed to render services they already were obligated to perform).
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being able to replace the workers, the workers occasionally refuse to
work without additional payment. The hiring party pays, then, after
the work is completed, sues for breach of contract and alleges unfair
practices. Again, in these circumstances, the hiring party originally
had no right to the worker's labor and is the party who claims unfair
practices. If the situation is reversed, and the hiring party refuses to
pay, then the laborer can sue for breach, and there is no need to claim
unfair practices, as the laborer was not forced to do any work he did
not agree to perform. Copyright, however, is different. In the context
of a contract between an author and a publisher, the copyright owner
initially has all of the rights. The author is the seller and the breaching
party who claims unfair practices. As the next Part explains, the
burden of proving that the contract was voluntarily entered into, and
that no unfair practices were employed, should be on the buyer-the
party attempting to acquire the rights.
IV. Shifting the Burden: From Copyright Holder (Author) to
Rights Purchaser (Publisher)
In the copyright context, the burden of proof should rest on the
publisher to show that no unfair practices were employed in the
creation of the contract. Shifting the burden for particular affirmative
defenses is not a novel concept. 9 There are a number of factors that
appear to warrant this shift.6° First, the shift is appropriate when it is
necessary to effectuate congressional intent.61 Second, if the
additional burden placed on the plaintiff is not great, it lends greater
justification to placing the burden on that party. 62 Cases where the
plaintiff has better information regarding the issue in question also

59. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Nationwide (In re McDaniel), 85 B.R. 69, 72 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1988) ("This procedure does shift the burden of proof on an affirmative defense to the
plaintiff."); Jay Dratler, Jr., Distillingthe Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43
U. MIAMI L. REv. 233, 322 (1988) ("Although fair use is an affirmative defense, it appears
appropriate for the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof of market effect, at least initially,
for several reasons.").
60. See STRONG, supra note 4, at § 337 ("Their allocation... will depend upon the
weight that is given to any one or more of several factors, including: (1) the natural
tendency to place the burdens on the party desiring change, (2) special policy
considerations such as those disfavoring certain defenses, (3) convenience, (4) fairness,
and (5) the judicial estimate of the probabilities.").
61. See In re McDaniel, 85 B.R. at 72 (referring to the necessity "to avoid a result
which would defeat Congressional intent").
62. See id. ("The burden, therefore, should not be great."); Dratler, supra note 59, at
322 (stating that a relatively small additional burden placed on the plaintiff does not seem
to be unfair).
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support a shift in the burden. 63 Finally, if placing the burden on the

defendant forces the defendant to prove a negative, this factor also
provides some justification for shifting the burden to the plaintifff6 As
will be seen below, all of these factors, and more, are present in
contracts between authors and publishers establishing a transfer of
copyrights. Furthermore, all of these problems would be alleviated by

effectuating a shift in the burden of proof.
A.

The Need to Shift the Burden

There are a number of factors which necessitate shifting the
burden of proof from the defendant-author, to the plaintiff-publisher.
Each of these factors, and how they impact copyright contracts, are
explained below.
1.

CongressionalIntent and ConstitutionalRequirement

In the copyright context, congressional intent is actually
mandated by the Constitution. The Constitution permits Congress to
grant copyrights "to Authors and Inventors." ' This means that if
Congress decides to utilize this power, the rights provided must be

conferred upon the authors. By enacting the Copyright Acts,
Congress implemented this enumerated power. Thus, in the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress provided that the rights granted in a

copyright vest initially in the author. 66 Furthermore, Congress
specifically provided authors with the ability to transfer individual

rights within the copyright without having to transfer the entire
copyright. 67 Therefore, it is necessary to give this initial allocation
some meaning, by providing authors with a method to receive benefit

from it.

63. See Dratler, supra note 59, at 322 ("[I]n most cases the plaintiff has better
information regarding the potential market effect than the defendant."); see also STRONG,
supra note 4, at § 337 ("A doctrine often repeated by the courts is that where the facts with
regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of a party, that party has the burden of
proving the issue.").
64. See Dratler, supra note 59, at 323 ("Finally, forcing the defendant to disprove a
market effect requires that he prove a negative-a difficult task in the best of cases."); see

also Cornelius J. Peck, PenetratingDoctrinalCamouflage: Understandingthe Development
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REv. 719, 768 (1991) ("To place the
burden of proof on the employee requires the employee to undertake what is frequently
impossible, that is to prove a negative.").
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
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Under the current system, authors have no method of insuring
that they receive a benefit for relinquishing their rights in a contract.
In order to have their work published, authors must confer the
publication right upon the publisher, through contractual means.
Thus, each time an author is forced to concede all of his rights for no
more consideration than he would have received for just the
publication right (or for a limited subset of rights included within the
bundle of rights that constitute a "copyright"), the congressional
intent is thwarted. The intent behind the grant of monopoly inherent
in a copyright is to promote progress, 68 but the practical means of
accomplishing this theoretical objective is by giving control of a work
to the author. This intent is buttressed by the creation of the ability to
divide the rights that constitute a copyright, which was a change from
the Copyright Act of 1909.69 Congress clearly intended to give authors
the ability to receive compensation for each of their rights, not just
for the most valuable few. 0 So, because the publisher merely has to
show that there was consideration for the contract, the author is stuck
trying to prove that the consideration did not include the entire
bundle of rights. This surely does not comport with the congressional
intent, which clearly attempts to provide the author with control over
the rights to his work, and does not place the author in a position to
have to prove that he retained those rights.
2.

Oligopoly in the PrintingIndustry/UnequalBargainingPower

Another factor that lends support to the need for shifting the
burden in the copyright context is the extreme inequality in
6& See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). In that

case, the Court stated that:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.... This result is
neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.
Id. (citations omitted).
69. Compare Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 201(d)(2), 90 Stat. 2541
("Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright... may be transferred... and
owned separately."), with Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 42, 35 Stat. 1075
("Copyright secured under this title or previous copyright laws of the United States may
be assigned, granted, or mortgaged by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of
the copyright, or may be bequeathed by will.").
70. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976) ("This provision, which has long been
sought by authors and their representatives,... means that any of the exclusive rights that
go to make up a copyright, including those enumerated in section 106 and any subdivision
of them, can be transferred and owned separately.").
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bargaining power. In contracts, relative equality in bargaining power
is an important characteristic of a fair exchange." Without relative
equality, the party with the greater bargaining power has the ability to
force concessions from the other party without offering additional
consideration. Although this does not happen on every occasion
involving unequal power, the likelihood that coercion or other unfair
practices will occur increases as the difference in bargaining power
increases. Therefore, extra precautions must be taken when
evaluating contracts made by parties with vastly different levels of
bargaining power.
For copyrights, publishers have vastly superior bargaining power
over authors. For the majority of authors who do not create "works
for hire," ' the author works as a freelance author. This means that
the author must sell any work he desires to have published to a
publisher. Although there are large numbers of freelance authors,
there are very few publishers.73 The publishing industry is an
oligopoly, which provides each individual publisher with a high level
of bargaining power over the numerous freelance authors.7 4
Therefore, if an author desires to publish his work, he must capitulate
to virtually every request a publisher makes of him. So if a publisher
requires him to transfer all of the rights embodied in his copyright
without any additional compensation, the author must either

71. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) ("There was no bargaining over
contractual terms between the parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining
power."); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972) (noting that "great
disparity in bargaining power" could be cause for invalidating a cognovit note); Jane
Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process,72 B.U. L. REv. 1, 56 (1992) ("Thus, the price paid
reflects the relative bargaining power of the parties, and the market can place a fair value
on an item only if the parties have equal bargaining power.") (citations omitted).
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (granting rights in a work made for hire to the
employer).
73. See Ruth Towse, CopyrightPolicy, CulturalPolicy and Support for Artists, in THE
ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 66, 69
(Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds., 2003) ("Artists are typically at a disadvantage in
relation to firms in the cultural industries for several reasons: as individuals, artists have
poor access to the capital market and therefore need to contract with a firm to distribute
their work, whereas the firm, often a multinational giant corporation in an oligopolised
industry has easy access.").
74. There are individual authors who are so popular as to have relatively equal
bargaining power with the publishers (e.g., Stephen King). In these cases, the bargaining
power is almost equal, so this factor does not provide an insight into whether the burden
should remain on the author or shift to the publisher. See id. at 70 ("[S]uperstars, by
contrast, have a strong bargaining position and their high incomes reflect the fact."). These
cases, however, are rare. Moreover, in certain contexts, such as the freelance journalist for
newspapers or magazines, this situation does not exist.
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acquiesce or forego publication. Thus, with copyright contracts, the
risk of the contract being the result of an unfair bargain is high.
3.

Access to Information and Ability to Prove/Disprove Unfair Practices

Another important inquiry is to determine if one party has much
better access to information than the other party. Vastly greater
access to information provides that party with a significantly
75
enhanced ability to either prove or disprove a question of fact. When
determining who should carry the burden of proof on that question of
fact, therefore, it is reasonable to assign the burden to the party with
the greater access to information, because the burden for him would
be lower than for the party with little or no information. Additionally,
a related line of inquiry is to determine if one party would be forced
to prove a negative. Proving a negative is "a difficult task in the best
of cases."7 6 Thus, it seems reasonable to place the burden on the party
who would not be forced to prove a negative.
In a contract between an author and a publisher, both of these
factors-access to information and the difficulty of proving a
negative-weigh towards placing the burden of proving that there
was no unfair practice on the publisher. First, the publisher has much
greater access to the information necessary to prove whether or not it
used unfair practices. The publisher is the party who drafted the
contract, and thus has access to all of the information and reasoning
that went into its creation. In addition, the publisher has access not
only to any previous contracts with this author, but also to all similar
contracts with other authors. This means that the publisher has access
to comparative information, which may be utilized to determine if the

75. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Errorin the New
ALB. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1996) ("This reconfiguration
hinged on at least two factors: plaintiffs often did not have access to all the information
that could help prove discrimination, and seemingly legitimate reasons given by employers
for adverse job actions were often masks for discrimination.") (citation omitted); Robin
Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 673 (2003) ("Given the difficulty of challenging
[scientific] information... one could argue that the governmental agency should bear the
burden of proving [its] accuracy... rather than the individual bearing the burden to prove
that [it] is wrong.... [T]he agency has better access to the information that would
determine whether inaccuracies exist."); Peck, supra note 64, at 768 ("Another factor
governing the allocation of the burden of proof is access to information."); Jennifer L.

Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60

Pariser, Note, In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol Presumptions in State
Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U. L.REv. 141, 155 (1989) ("Presumptions also expedite
trials and force the party with the best access to information to come forward by shifting
the burden of proof to that party.") (citation omitted).
76. Dratler, supranote 59, at 323.
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contract in question is fair. 77 The author has no way to explain why
the publisher required the transfer of each individual right included in
the contract, and he only has access to his previous contracts with the
publisher. He has no access to any contract with other authors,
without getting those records from the publisher. Second, the author
would be forced to prove a negative-that he did not assent to the
transfer of every right included in the copyright. When attempting to
prove that the publisher coerced him to transfer additional rights for
no additional compensation, the author is actually trying to prove that
he did not assent to the considerations given and received. The
publisher, on the other hand, only has to show that the author
assented to the contract. Although it appears as though the publisher
would have to prove a negative, that no unfair practices were
employed, in reality the publisher must merely show that the author
assented to the terms of the contract. This showing could be as simple
as proving that the consideration was adequate for the rights
transferred, by demonstrating that the consideration was significantly
greater than that given in contracts where only a limited number of
rights were exchanged. Thus, shifting the burden would take a highly
onerous burden off of the author and only impose a modest burden
on the publisher.
4.

Inadequacy of Consideration:A Lack of Compensationfor Increased
Transfer of Rights

Finally, and most importantly, the lack of additional
compensation given to authors for the transfer of additional rights
militates in favor of shifting the burden. An example of this can be
found in New York Times v. Tasini.78 In that case, certain publishers
contracted with online computer database companies to place the
plaintiff freelance authors' works in the databases. The authors
complained that the placement of their articles in these databases
infringed upon their copyrights. The publishers responded by
asserting that they had the right to include the works in the databases,
based on § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which states:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is
distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests
initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an
77. Courts and juries make similar determinations on a regular basis. The comparison
amongst previous contracts and other authors would have to take into account a number
of variables, including popularity of the author (affecting the author's bargaining power),
number of rights within the copyright transferred, and the amount of consideration
provided for those rights.
78. 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner
of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired
only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution
as part of that particular work, any revision of that collective work,
and any later collective work in the same series.

The court held in favor of the authors, concluding that the
publishers infringed the authors' copyrights.80 The court also stated,
however, that "[t]he parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter into
an agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the
Authors' works.",8' This statement opened the door for publishers, in
future contracts, to merely require the right to place the work in a
database as part of the consideration given by the author. Although
this decision benefited the author-plaintiffs, it is unlikely that other
authors will benefit from the right recognized by the Court. Because
publishers only have to include this right in the contract (thereby
"expressly transferring it"), they do not have to offer any additional
consideration to the author. Thus, the intent of both Congress and the
Supreme Court has again been undermined by placing the burden of
proof on the author.
B.

Effect of Shifting the Burden

There is a simple, expedient solution to all of these problems:
shift the burden of proof from the author to the publisher,82 making
the publisher prove that it did not engage in unfair practices and that
the author assented to all of the terms of the contract. Although this
solution creates an unusual allocation of the burden of proof, it
provides a number of benefits that justify its inception. These benefits
give meaning to the initial allocation of rights, create a more
equitable and fair bargaining process, and generate additional
incentives for the promotion of progress of the arts.
The first set of effects generated by this shift is that it solves all of
the problems discussed above, thereby effectuating the initial
allocation of rights and leveling the relative bargaining power
between the author and the publisher. Shifting the burden would

79. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
80. The court, in coming to this conclusion, relied upon the need to effectuate the
intent of Congress. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 497 ("It would scarcely 'preserve the author's
copyright in a contribution' as contemplated by Congress, H.R. Rep. 122, if a newspaper
or magazine publisher were permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of the author's
contribution in isolation or within new collective works.").
81. Id. at 505.
82. Again, as discussed above, supra note 5, this shift can be viewed as nothing more
than the creation of a presumption in favor of authors that must be rebutted by publishers.
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effectuate, and give some meaning to, the congressional intent and
the Constitutional mandate. This intent was clearly to provide authors
with some control over their work, with the overall goal of promoting
progress of the useful arts.8 The Supreme Court even recognized this
intent in its opinion in Tasini. 4 Therefore, allowing authors to force
publishers to provide extra compensation for additional rights gives
some credence to this intent. In addition, the intent behind the
severability of the individual rights which make up a copyright, a
distinct change in the 1976 Copyright Act from the 1909 Act,8 also
gains some purpose with this shift. Otherwise, the copyright cannot be
divided if the author desires to publish his work, because the
publisher will require the entire bundle of rights. The shift also
increases the bargaining power of the author and decreases the
bargaining power of the publisher. The author's power is increased by
the knowledge of both parties that he does not need to prove that the
publisher coerced him to transfer additional rights to the publisher.
Therefore the author does not have to prove that he did not assent to
the terms of the contract. If both parties know this, the power of the
author is enhanced, because he can insist upon either retaining some
of his rights or receiving extra compensation. If neither of these
events occurs, then the publisher has to prove that the author still
assented to the terms. This means that the author can insist on some
concessions from the publisher if the publisher insists on acquiring
additional rights from the author, a power that the author did not
previously have. Furthermore, the publisher's power decreases for the
same reasons. Because both parties know the publisher must prove
that the author assented to the contract, the publisher cannot force
the author to make concessions without making concessions of its
own. In addition, the shift places the burden on the publisher, the
party with greater access to information. This additional burden
increases the burden of production on the publisher when suing an
author for breach of contract after the author exercises a disputed
right. Again, adding a downstream burden on a party decreases that
party's bargaining power at the time of the contract's creation. This
increased burden is not particularly onerous, however, because the
publisher already has access to all of the information necessary to
carry its burden. Thus, the only impact this shift has is to force the
83. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 123 (1976) ("The purpose of this subsection is to
reaffirm the basic principle that the United States copyright of an individual author shall
be secured to that author, and cannot be taken away by any involuntary transfer.").
84. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at 495-96 (discussing the legislative history of the 1976 Act).
85. See supra note 69.
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publisher to either provide adequate additional compensation for
additional rights transferred by the author, or to refrain from taking
those rights from the author in the first place. Either way, the
bargaining power is closer to relative parity, and the environment for
the promotion of arts is more equitable.
The other effect of shifting the burden is to generate additional
incentives for the promotion of progress of the arts. This is
accomplished not only by creating a more equitable bargaining
environment, but also by protecting authors' copy-rights. Although
the purpose of copyrights is generally considered to be the promotion
of progress of the arts,86 the method chosen to achieve this end is a
limited grant of monopoly to authors over their works.8n By allowing
publishers to usurp this monopoly from authors, we divest authors of
this generally accepted method of encouraging authors to invest their
time and energy into the creation of new works. Shifting the burden,
however, hinders the transfer of rights to publishing companies,
thereby re-instilling this necessary encouragement to the authors. In
this way, Congress can reassert that rights are initially vested in
authors, not in publishing companies. Thus, because the authors
would regain control over their works and would receive
compensation for all of their rights, and not just the initial right of
publication, this shift would re-incentivize authors to promote
progress through the production of the arts.
Conclusion
Copyright rights are statutorily and Constitutionally initially
vested in authors. 8 In addition, authors have the statutory right to
sever the bundle of rights and keep or dispose of each right within the
copyright, individually or as a group.8 9 This initial allocation of rights
86. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
193 (1968) ("The dominant idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution appears to
have been the promotion of learning.").
87. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). In that
case, the Court stated that:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures
authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build
freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.... This result is
neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.
Id. (citations omitted).
8& See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000).
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needs to be protected and supported. To achieve this protection,
Congress should shift the burden of proof away from the author, who
currently must prove that he did not assent to the transfer of all of the
rights by showing that the publisher engaged in unfair practices, to
the publisher, forcing the publisher to prove that the author did
assent and that it did not coerce the author to make concessions.
In this situation, the presumption should be in favor of the
author, that he did not freely give up additional rights, not included in
previous contracts and not necessary to the right of first publication.
In the event of a dispute, the burden should rest on the publisher to
show that those rights were voluntarily contracted away. This
placement of the burden would decrease the disparity in bargaining
power between the parties, thereby making the contractual terms
more equitable. Moreover, it would give meaning to the initial
allocation of rights and generate incentives for authors to promote
progress by creating new works. Therefore, this shift would promote
the aims of the Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act.
This proposal may generate some pause at the idea of placing the
burden of proof for an affirmative defense on the plaintiff, and not on
the defendant. The hesitancy on the part of legislatures or courts to
place this burden on the plaintiff has been overcome on previous
occasions, however. 90 In addition, this proposal could be analyzed
under a different light. Instead of considering this a shift in the
burden of an affirmative defense, it could be considered an additional
burden of production on the plaintiff in bringing a breach of contract
claim. 9' To prove that the contract for copy-rights was breached,
Congress could impose the burden of proving that the terms of the
contract were voluntarily agreed upon, and reached by mutual
bargaining, on the plaintiff. Thus, seen in this light, there would be no
shift at all, but an allocation of a burden of production on the
plaintiff. No matter how it is analyzed, however, this proposal would
create a more equitable environment for the transfer of copy-rights
from an author to a publisher, and would effectuate and promote the
intent of Congress in granting these rights.
90. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Nationwide (In re McDaniel), 85 B.R. 69, 72 (Bankr. N.D.
IM.1988) ("This procedure does shift the burden of proof on an affirmative defense to the
plaintiff."); Dratler, supra note 59, at 322 ("Although fair use is an affirmative defense, it
appears appropriate for the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof of market effect, at least
initially, for several reasons.").
91. See STRONG, supra note 4, at § 337 ("The burdens of pleading and proof with
regard to most facts have been and should be assigned to the plaintiff who generally seeks
to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to
bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.").

